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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS-MEMPHIS
STREET CLOSING: MINIMAL INCONVENIENCE OR
MONUMENT TO RACIAL HOSTILITY? City of Memphis
v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
The city of Memphis, Tennessee closed the north end of
West Drive, a street that traverses the all-white residential
community of Hein Park.1 The city's stated purpose for clos-
ing West Drive was to reduce the flow of traffic on the street,
thereby increasing the safety of the many children in the area
and decreasing traffic pollution in a residential neighborhood.2
Following the city's decision to close the street, the re-
sidents of the predominately black community to the north
filed a class action in federal district court against the City of
Memphis and various city officials.$ The complaint alleged
that the city's action was unconstitutional and requested a
prohibitive injunction. Plaintiffs also alleged that the barrier
across the street was a "badge of slavery" prohibited by the
0 1982 by JoAnn Guzik
1. "[H]ein Park was developed prior to World War II as an exclusive residential
neighborhood for white citizens and these characteristics have been maintained."
Greene v. City of Memphis, 610 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1979). West Drive is a one-
half mile long, two lane street that passes through the center of Hein Park. Its south-
ern end is near the entrance to a 342 acre municipal park and recreation area that
includes a zoo and golf course. It is one of five streets that enter Hein Park. City of
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 102-03 (1981).
2. In 1973, members of the Hein Park Civic Association filed with the city and
county planning association a formal application to close streets or alleys. A prior
attempt was made in 1970 to close four streets leading into the subdivision. Objec-
tions were made by the police, fire, and sanitation departments and the application
was denied. A traffic report at that time indicated that much of the traffic through
Hein Park could be eliminated by closing West Drive. 451 U.S. at 103-04. Traffic
studies had counted 1600 to 1700 cars per 12 hour period on West Drive and 200 cars
per hour during peak periods. Id. at 114 n.22.
3. The class certified consisted of "black persons in the City of Memphis who
own or stand to inherit property surrounding and adjoining the area along West
Drive and Hein Park Subdivision." Id. at 105 n.6.
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thirteenth amendment.4 The complaint stated that the closing
would impair the value of the residents' property and there-
fore violated the fourteenth amendment.5 The district court
granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint failed to allege any injury to the plaintiffs.I
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed and remanded, finding that the facts alleged in the
complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiffs, stated claims under section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act.8
Section 1982 protects the rights of citizens in the acquisition,
sale, and use of property.9 The court concluded that the com-
plaint sufficiently alleged that the city had conferred the ben-
efits of the privacy and quiet of an exclusive dead end street
on the white residents.10 Accordingly, the circuit court held
4. The 13th amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
5. The 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in part:
Section 1. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. 14, §1.
6. The district court held that the class had no standing to bring suit since no
member of the class lived on West Drive and therefore had no constitutional property
rights in continued access to West Drive. 451 U.S. at 106 n.8. In determining that
plaintiffs had no cause of action, the district court relied on Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217 (1971) in which a city was permitted to close a municipal pool in response to
an order to desegregate the pool. Palmer held that since white residents and black
residents would be prevented from using the pool, there was no unequal benefit. The
district court in Greene felt Palmer was directly applicable since both black residents
and white residents would be denied passage through that portion of West Drive. 451
U.S. at 105-06 n.7.
7. Greene v. City of Memphis, 535 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1976).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). See infra note 35 for
complete text of § 1982.
9. Section 2 of the 13th amendment gives Congress the power to enact legisla-
tion to abolish both the conditions of involuntary servitude and the "badges and inci-
dents of slavery." 451 U.S. at 125 and n.38. Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act,
which is considered 13th amendment enabling legislation, provides broad protection
for citizens whose property rights are violated as a result of racial discrimination.
10. 535 F.2d at 978.
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that if the respondents could prove that the city officials had
granted the street closing request as a result of racial consid-
erations, the class would have a valid claim under section
1982.11
On remand, the district court identified three issues: (1)
whether a benefit was conferred on the white residents and
denied to the black residents; (2) whether there was a discrim-
inatory motive; (3) whether normal city procedures were fol-
lowed in the street closing. 2
Following a full trial, the district court held for the city
on all three issues. The district court found: (1) because prior
closings of undedicated streets and alleys had benefited both
the black residents and the white residents, no benefit was
conferred unequally;" (2) although the street closing would
have a disproportionate impact on certain black citizens, the
impact was not so blatant that a racially discriminatory pur-
pose could be inferred 4 and, (3) normal city procedures had
been followed.' 5
On appeal after the remand the Sixth Circuit accepted
the district court's conclusions, but held that the lower court
erred in focusing primarily upon the issue of whether a benefit
had been conferred unequally. The court of appeals recog-
nized that its earlier holding had induced the narrow "equal
treatment" focus on remand. Nevertheless, it stated that re-
spondents need not show that they had been denied a similar
street closing application. The court stated that respondents
could demonstrate that this particular closing was a "badge
of slavery" under both section 1982 and the thirteenth
amendment without reference to the equal treatment issue.' 6
The court of appeals listed four elements that formed the
11. The Sixth Circuit also stated that the respondents had a claim under § 1983
of the Civil Rights Act with regard to the official action involved in the street closing.
535 F.2d at 978-79. The Supreme Court did not address § 1983 except to state that it
applied to official action only. 451 U.S. at 120.
12. Id. at 107.
13. Id. at 107 n.10.
14. Id. at 107 n.11. It is relevant to note that although the district court ruled in
favor of the city, this ruling was in response to the narrow issue presented on remand.
In the district court judge's opinion, the closing was racially motivated and would
lead to racial hostility and vandalism. He stated that the "closing symbolizes in un-
mistakable terms a white neighborhood shutting its door on its adjacent black and
integrated communities." 610 F.2d at 399.
15. 451 U.S. at 107-09.
16. 610 F.2d at 400-02, 404 & 404 n.13.
19821
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basis of its decision and necessitated relief under section 1982:
(1) the closing benefited a white neighborhood and adversely
affected a black neighborhood; (2) the "barrier was to be er-
ected precisely at the point of separation of these neighbor-
hoods and would undoubtedly have the effect of limiting con-
tact between them"; (3) the closing was a "unique step to
protect one neighborhood from outside influence which the re-
sidents considered to be 'undesirable'" instead of part of a
city-wide plan; and (4) there was evidence of depreciated
property values in the black neighborhood.17
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 18 The Court
held that the court of appeals' findings did not support the
conclusion that the street closing prevented the black re-
sidents from exercising the same property rights as the white
residents. The majority found that the street closing was
merely a minimal inconvenience.19 The Court also found that
the barrier did not violate the thirteenth amendment as the
closing of West Drive could not fairly be characterized as a
"badge of slavery"20 but was instead a routine burden of citi-
zenship. 1 The Court concluded that the interests of safety
and tranquility that motivated the closing were legitimate and
justified the adverse impact on the motorists.22
The Supreme Court examined the four elements that
formed the basis of the court of appeals' decision. In response
to the first element, that a benefit had been conferred on the
white residents, the Court examined a detailed traffic flow
analysis and concluded that while it was primarily the black
residents who would be inconvenienced by the closing, this in-
convenience would be minimal.28 Moreover, regarding the sec-
ond element, the Court stated that the Sixth Circuit had
placed too much emphasis on the idea of the barrier separat-
ing the neighborhoods since, in reality, the barrier was merely
a low curb that would allow the passage of municipal vehicles.
The Court reasoned that this type of street closing would not
17. 451 U.S. at 109.
18. 451 U.S. at 100.
19. Id. at 111.
20. Id. at 110.
21. Id. at 129.
22. Id. at 110, 119.
23. Id. at 110-12, nn. 15-18.
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impede the social or commercial contact between the areas.2 4
The Court looked at the purpose behind the closing in
analyzing the third element-that the street closing was an
isolated step to protect one neighborhood from undesirable
influences. The Court relied on the district court's findings
and determined that the "undesirable traffic" that the white
residents wished to reduce was all excessive traffic with its ac-
companying pollution and congestion, rather than specific
traffic from the black neighborhood." The court of appeals
had relied upon evidence presented at the city council hear-
ings and to the district court, to show that there was racial
hostility among the residents of the two communities. In re-
sponse to this argument, the Court noted that since respon-
dents had sued the city and its officials, the analysis must fo-
cus on the decisions of those officials and not on the actions of
some of the residents.2 The Court noted that the record did
not indicate that the residents of Hein Park would welcome a
heavy flow of traffic through their neighborhood if the drivers
were white. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated
that it is unlikely that a mother who finds herself rushing to
the window when she hears the screeching of car brakes is
concerned about the race of the driver.27
The fourth element relied on by the court of appeals con-
cerned the adverse economic impact on the black community.
The district court found no evidence of depreciation in prop-
erty values resulting from the street closing. There was, how-
ever, evidence that the psycbological effect of the barrier
could cause a loss of community spirit which would result in a
failure to maintain property and thus lower the value of the
homes in the area. The Supreme Court agreed with the dis-
trict court and summarily discounted the speculation concern-
ing the psychological effect of the closing.2
24. Id. at 112. The Sixth Circuit found that the actual closing was going to be
accomplished by selling the strip of land to the residents whose property directly
abutted the section that was to be closed. There was doubt expressed in the lower
courts as to the intentions of these parties and whether they would eventually close
off the section to pedestrian traffic as well. Only the city of Memphis retained an
easement for the use of municipal vehicles. 610 F.2d at 396.
25. 451 U.S. at 114.
26. Id. at n.23. In this footnote, the Court has left room for an inference that
city officials were aware of the full degree of racial hostility within the neighborhood.
27. Id. at 116-17 n.27.
28. Id. at 117-18 and nn.29 & 30.
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In summary, the Court determined that the city's interest
in protecting the safety and tranquility of a residential neigh-
borhood was a proper motive for the closing. The Court stated
that the city's action was not racially motivated and that
there was no reason to believe that a similar benefit would not
be conferred on the black property owners. In essence, the
Court held that the closing had simply caused some black mo-
torists a slight inconvenience."'
The city of Memphis asked the Court to rule that respon-
dent's claims under the thirteenth amendment and section
198280 were barred by failure to prove discriminatory intent
regarding the street closing. This argument was based on pre-
vious Supreme Court decisions that required proof of discrim-
inatory intent in claims involving official action." In response,
the Court noted that the prior decisions concerned challenges
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, which related to official action only.2 Recognizing that
the class action in Greene also challenged certain official ac-
tion in closing the street, the Court noted that the provisions
on which the challenge was based (section 1982 and the thir-
teenth amendment) also covered certain private actions and
the question of proof of discriminatory intent in private ac-
tions has not been settled." Furthermore, the Court stated
that to avoid addressing the "private-action discriminatory in-
tent" issue prematurely, it would first ascertain if either sec-
tion 1982 or the thirteenth amendment applied to the closing.
The Court was ultimately able to avoid decision on the intent
issue by finding no relationship between the street closing and
29. Id. at 110.
30. See infra note 35 for relevant portion of § 1982.
31. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
32. See note 5 supra.
33. In Jones v. Alfred Mayer, Co., 393 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court held that §
1982 is applicable to discriminatory actions by private individuals. In Jones, the
Court looked first to the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), where it was decided
that the 13th amendment was not a simple prohibition of slavery but an absolute
declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in the United States.
The Jones Court did not decide if the 13th amendment itself did anything more than
abolish slavery, but looked to § 2 of the amendment, the enabling clause, to find
constitutional justification for the prohibition of discriminatory actions. The issue of
whether or not discriminatory intent or purpose was necessary was not addressed in
Jones.
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either section 1982 or the thirteenth amendment.3 4
The Court first explored the statutory question." In im-
plementing the remedial purpose of section 1982, the Court
has broadly construed the language of the statute to protect
not only the property rights acquired by black Citizens, but
also their right to acquire and use property on an equal ba-
sis.8 The Court differentiated Greene from prior decisions
which involved actions designed to prevent black residents
from acquiring certain property rights, such as racially moti-
vated refusals to sell or rent to black citizens, 7 restrictive ra-
cial covenants on property transfers,8 and refusals to assign a
club membership to a black citizen in a leasing agreement for
the property. 9 The majority in Greene determined that the
only injury to respondents was that they would have to use
one street instead of another.40
The Court listed situations where the relationship of a
person's property and the street closing would support a chal-
lenge to the statute: if the black residents are refused a simi-
lar street closing application, if the official action depreciates
the value of the property owned by members of the black
community, or if the street closing severely restricts access to
the black citizens' homes and they are hampered in the use of
their property. 1 The majority stated that the record showed
no such restrictions in Greene. Therfore, the inconvenience to
the black residents who live in the area to the north of the
closing was not found to be a property right that is afforded
protection under section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act.43
The Court then addressed the question of any possible
thirteenth amendment violation. Respondents claimed that
34. 451 U.S. at 119-20.
35. Section 1982 provides in relevant part: "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property."
42 U.S.C. § 1982.
36. 451 U.S. at 120.
37. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 393 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1977).
38. Hurd v. Hedge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
39. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
40. 451 U.S. at 124.
41. Id. at 124. The Court referred to an Alabama case that involved a street
barrier that did violate the statute. Id. at 123-24 n.36. In Jennings v. Patterson, one
white resident who lived on the other side of a barrier was given access to the street,
while the black residents were not. 488 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. 451 U.S. at 124.
1982]
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because the street closing had conferred a benefit on the white
residents and had placed a burden on the black residents, it
was therefore an unconstitutional "badge of slavery. ' 43 The
city of Memphis argued that unless there was a violation of
the thirteenth amendment's enabling legislation (e.g. !section
1982), the street closing could not be characterized as a
"badge of slavery."" In response, the Court noted that al-
though Congress enacted section 1982 pursuant to section 2 of
the thirteenth amendment to abolish the badges and incidents
of slavery, this "exercise of authority is not inconsistent with
the view that the Amendment has self-executing force."'4 5 The
Court reviewed the official action challenged in Greene and
found that the "disparate impact on black citizens could not,
in any event, be fairly characterized as a badge or incident of
slavery."'46 Therefore, there could be no thirteenth amend-
ment violation. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reiter-
ated that the record disclosed no racially discriminatory mo-
tive on the part of the city council. Proper management of the
flow of traffic necessarily requires the accommodation of con-
flicting interests. The Court stated that local governments
may exercise wide discretion in making such policy decisions,
noting that the city of Memphis was acting within its consti-
tutional powers when it closed West Drive because it favored
the interests of safety and tranquility.4 7 Those interests were
43. Id.
44. The city relied on Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). See supra note
6. In Palmer the Court stated that § 2 of the 13th amendment gave Congress the
power to eradicate "badges of slavery" through legislation. The action challenged in
Palmer did not violate any statute and therefore was held not to be a "badge of
slavery." In Greene the city of Memphis argued that if there were no violation of §
1982 there could be no "badge of slavery." 451 U.S. at 124, n.37.
45. Id. at 125. Although responding to the city's argument by stating that the
13th amendment has its own force, the Court still left open the question of whether §
1 of the amendment by its own terms does anything more than abolish slavery. Fur-
thermore, in deciding the narrow constitutional question presented in Greene the
Court refused to speculate about the type of impact on a racial group that might be
prohibited by the amendment itself. Id. at 128-29.
46. Id. at 126.
47. As a matter of constitutional law, a city's power to adopt rules that
will avoid anticipated traffic safety problems is the same as its power to
correct those hazards that have been revealed by actual events. The de-
cision to reduce the flow of traffic on West Drive was motivated, in part
by an interest in the safety of children walking to school. That interest
is equally legitimate whether it provides support for an arguably unnec-
essary preventive measure or for a community's reaction to a tragic acci-
dent that adequate planning might have prevented.
[Vol. 22
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found sufficient to justify the inconvenience to motorists. Rea-
soning that the inconvenience could not be considered an ac-
tual restraint on the liberty of the black citizens, the Court
determined:
The argument that the closing violates the Thirteenth
Amendment must therefore rest, not on the actual conse-
quences of the closing, but rather on the symbolic signifi-
cance of the fact that most of the drivers who will be in-
convenienced are black.
But the inconvenience of the drivers is a function of
where they live and where they regularly drive - not a
function of their race ....
The Court emphasized that any traffic regulation, from a
speed limit to a detour to a traffic light, will have different
impact on different segments of the community, regardless of
its race. The Court concluded that to consider these inevitable
consequences "as a . . . stigma so severe as to violate the
Thirteenth Amendment would trivialize the great purpose of
that charter of freedom. 4 9
Concurring, Justice White criticized the majority for deal-
ing with questions outside the scope of the issue presented to
the Court. In his opinion, the sole question was whether a
nonintentional adverse impact upon black citizens is a suffi-
cient basis for relief under section 1982.50 After examining the
legislative history of the statute, he concluded that section
1982 requires proof of discriminatory intent. Therefore, he
concurred based upon the lower court's findings of an absence
of unlawful intent.5 1
Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion which was
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Justice Marshall
analyzed in detail the four elements which had formed the ba-
sis of the court of appeals' decison. He concluded that there
was ample evidence to support the Sixth Circuit's finding that
the barrier was unconstitutional. On the issue of "minimal in-
convenience," Justice Marshall stated that black drivers were
being forced to take a longer route because they did not live
Id. at 126-27.
48. Id. at 128.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 130 (White, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 135.
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in a "protected" neighborhood. 2 In Justice Marshall's opin-
ion, the curb, which he called a "monument to racial hostil-
ity," is a barrier. 8 Furthermore, he pointed out that this bar-
rier to traffic is to be erected at the precise point where the
all-white Hein Park and the black neighborhood join.
Justice Marshall disputed the majority's finding that
there was no evidence of a racially discriminatory motive in
the street closing. He referred to Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Corp.5' where the Court held that it may be
necessary to make a sensitive inquiry into the facts in order to
determine whether an invidious discriminatory pupose is pre-
sent. Under Arlington Heights, discriminatory impact is not
determinative; the court must look to other evidence."
To support his analysis, Justice Marshall referred to the
testimony of the witnesses at the city council hearings regard-
ing the nature of the traffic it wished to exclude. He empha-
sized that the black property owners north of the closing were
given no notice of the hearings to close the street. More im-
portantly, this was the first time Memphis had closed a street
for traffic control purposes. In Justice Marshall's opinion,
these factors- are precisely the kind that the Court in Arling-
ton Heights deemed relevant to an inquiry into motivation."
The dissenters also expressed concern over the potential
adverse impact in the black community. Unlike the majority,
the dissenters stated that the psychological effect could be sig-
nificant.57 Justice Marshall concluded that the carving out of
racial enclaves is precisely the type of injury that section 1982
and the thirteenth amendment were enacted to prevent. 8 He
stated that the legislature clearly intended to prohibit local
discriminatory customs as well as disriminatory state laws. 9
The Court's opinion appears to be a major step backward
in the area of civil rights. Further analysis shows that respon-
dents' main constitutional claim was for the loss of the use of
their property but, they did not lose such rights. If in fact
52. Id. at 138-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 140.
54. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
55. 451 U.S. at 140-41 & n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 144.
57. Id. at 145-46.
58. Id. at 154.
59. Id. at 149.
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there is no economic depreciation involved and society gives
no weight to the psychological effect of the barrier, then re-
spondents have not been affected in a manner that may be
legally protected. This case illustrates a dilemma that the
courts consistently struggle to solve: balancing the ability of
local governments to control their communities against the
need to protect individual rights.
There is, however, a major underlying element in Greene
that tempers any attempt at rationalizing the conclusion. The
fact that the city of Memphis' record concerning racial dis-
crimination is not unblemished raises doubts about the
Court's reasoning. This concern surfaced in both the majority
and the dissenting opinions in reference to the city's slow
compliance with desegregation policies. 0 The Sixth Circuit
stated "[t]he result under the unique circumstances here, can
only be seen as one more of the many humiliations which soci-
ety has historically visited upon blacks."61 It appears that
there was enough evidence of questionable intent from the
city council hearings and the lower court proceedings for the
Court to apply the test announced in Arlington Heights re-
garding official action.
In Greene the Court literally followed the wording of sec-
tion 1982 concerning the loss of property rights. In so doing, it
laid a foundation for any community to close off streets that
border an area it deems undesirable. All that is necessary is to
define the word "undesirable" in terms of traffic congestion
and pollution, which will not be difficult in this age of in-
creased automobile use. There is language in Greene, however,
that would possibly inhibit such activities. The Court appears
to place emphasis on the absence of prior Memphis street
closings involving racial overtones. This dictum could be used
to prevent the establishment of similar barriers in racially seg-
regated communities. This same analysis, however, appears to
leave each city free to erect at least one such barrier regard-
less of whether it is considered a "monument to racial hostil-
ity" or simply a "minimally inconvenient" traffic control
decision.
JoAnn Guzik
60. Id. at 116, n.27 & 143-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. 610 F.2d at 404.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-
CALIFORNIA'S GENDER BASED STATUTORY RAPE
LAW HELD CONSTITUTIONAL BY UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT-Michael M. v. Superior Court of So-
noma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
In July 1978, defendant was charged with violating Cali-
fornia's statutory rape law which prohibits sexual intercourse
with a non-spouse female under the age of 18 years.' Prior to
trial, defendant made a motion to dismiss the charges on the
basis that the statute violated the equal protection clause of
both the United States and California Constitutions, in that
only males could be prosecuted under its provisions.2 The trial
court denied defendant's motion. On review, the California
court of appeal and the California Supreme Court" upheld the
statute. Defendant appealed to the United States Supreme
Court which granted certiorari.4 The Court ruled, in Michael
M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,5 that California's
statutory rape law does not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
The United States Supreme Court generally reviews stat-
utes challenged on equal protection grounds under either the
rational relationship test or the strict scrutiny test. Cases in-
0 1982 by Srinoi G. Rousseau
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981), "Unlawful sexual intercourse is
an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetra-
tor, where the female is under the age of 18 years."
2. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 25 Cal.3d 608, 610, 601
P.2d 572, 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342 (1979).
3. The reasoning of the California Supreme Court in affirming the constitution-
ality of the statute was similar to that of the United States Supreme Court even
though the California Supreme Court considered sex as a suspect class and applied
the strict scrutiny test. Id.
4. Cert. granted, 447 U.S. 904 (1980).
5. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
6. The rational relationship test requires only that the legislature have a consti-
tutionally permissible purpose. The challenger has the burden of proof that the clas-
sification is essentially arbitrary and does not rest on any reasonable basis. William-
son v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61 (1911).
The strict scrutiny approach, on the other hand, places a heavy burden on the
state to justify the regulation. This approach requires that there be a "compelling
state interest" and that the statute be "necessary . . . to the accomplishment of a
permissible state policy." Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
943
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volving challenges to gender based classifications, however,
have been reviewed by an intermediate test developed in Reed
v. Reed,7 and Craig v. Boren.8 This test requires that a gender
based classification "must serve important governmental
objectives and . . . be substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives."' In Michael M., all of the Justices
of the United States Supreme Court agreed to the applicabil-
ity of the intermediate test because the case dealt with a gen-
der based statutory rape law.'0 However, the Justices dis-
agreed on the application of the test.
Four Justices, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Stewart, and Justice Powell, accepted one interpreta-
tion of the test and wrote the plurality opinion. The plurality
found the state's objective, prevention of illegitimate teenage
pregnancies, to be valid." According to the legislative history,
California's statutory rape law was based on archaic sexual
stereotyping.' But, the plurality said it would not strike down
this statute on the basis of an alleged improper legislative mo-
tive if the statute could be found to be otherwise constitu'
tional. s The plurality found that the statute was not based on
"the baggage of sexual stereotypes,"" but instead, was based
on the valid state objective of preventing illegitimate teenage
pregnancies."5 The plurality believed that the state had a
265, 266 (1978); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); see also Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1973).
7. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
8. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Wein-
berger v. Weisenfield, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
9. Craig v. Boren; 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (construing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 75 (1971)).
10. The United States Supreme Court declared in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), that sex was a "suspect class," but this ruling has not been followed
in subsequent cases since it was declared by a plurality of only four Justices. See, e.g.,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). In
addition, the Michael M. plurality did not find the strict scrutiny test appropriate
since it did not consider men as a "suspect class" which would warrant the "special
solicitude of the courts." 450 U.S. at 476. See United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
11. 450 U.S. at 470.
12. Id. at 472 n.7. Stereotyping found in a statute's legislative motive, such as
presumption of male aggression and protection of female chastity, has been held un-
constitutional. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
13. 450 U.S. at 473-74.
14. Id. at 476 (quoting Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283).
15. Logically, if the purpose of the statute is to prevent pregnancy,
prepubescent females should not be included, and defenses such as sterility, birth
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strong interest in preventing these pregnancies because of the
significant social, medical, and economic consequences for
both mother and child, and the state.16
Persuaded that the statute had a legitimate state objec-
tive, the plurality evaluated the connection between the stat-
ute's gender based classification and the state's objective and
found that they were "sufficiently related. ' 17 The plurality
emphasized a principle underlying the decisions in this area of
equal protection, that gender classifications are not invidious
if they "realistically reflect the fact that the sexes are not sim-
ilarly situated in certain circumstances. ''1s California's statute
was held to reasonably reflect the fact that the consequences
of sexual intercourse and pregnancy are greater for the fe-
male. The plurality relied on the "natural sanctions,"1 9 the
physiological, psychological, and sociological problems and
risks of sexual intercourse on minor females, as a basis for jus-
tifying this statutory rape law. The plurality believed that
these "natural sanctions" act as a deterrent on the sexual ac-
tivity of minor females. Therefore, the California legislature
was acting within its authority when it enacted the statutory
rape law because it placed criminal sanctions on males to
"'equalize' the deterrents on the sexes."'20
Justice Blackmun concurred with the judgment of the
plurality and determined that the statutory rape law was con-
control, and non-emission should be admitted. But, the plurality said that the pre-
vention of illegitimate teenage pregnancies was only "one of the purposes," thereby
averting a logical attack since inclusion of prepubescents could be justified on alter-
native grounds such as the prevention of physical injury. Id. at 470.
16. Id. at 470-71.
17. Id. at 472-73.
18. Id. at 464. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979); California v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlessinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
19. 450 U.S. at 473.
20. Id. The plurality also reasoned that a gender-neutral statute would frustrate
the state's interest in effective enforcement because females would be less likely to
report violations if subject to prosecution. Id. at 472-73. But, the dissenting Justice
Brennan argued persuasively that,
In contrast to laws governing forcible rape, statutory rape laws apply to
consensual sexual activity. Force is not an element of the crime. Since a
woman who consents to an act of sexual intercourse is unlikely to report
her partner to the police-whether or not she is subject to criminal
sanctions-enforcement would not be undermined if the statute were to
be made gender neutral.
Id. at 493 n.7.
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stitutional. He did not explain, however, how the statute had
met the intermediate test of Craig. Justice Blackmun was in-
fluenced, in casting his vote with the plurality, by California's
statutory scheme. The California statute challenged was part
of a very broad statutory scheme."1 According to Blackmun
this supported the statute since in two previous cases"
outside California the statutory rape laws were held unconsti-
tutional because the states lacked additional statutes protect-
ing both male and female minors.
Justice Blackmun "reluctantly"28 concluded that the un-
derlying facts could fit the crime. He based his conclusion on
the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. The evi-
dence showed that, although the female was willing initially,
the defendant had to strike her at least twice before she sub-
mitted to sexual intercourse. 4 In addition, Justice Blackmun
pointed out the closeness of their ages, a difference of a little
more than a year. Justice Stevens accurately countered that
the evidence of the preliminary hearing should not have had a
bearing on the constitutional question of this case. 5
In their dissent, Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall
agreed that the statute's gender based classification did not
pass the Craig v. Boren test. They concluded that there was
insufficient evidence showing any substantial relationship of
the classification to the state's asserted goal of preventing ille-
gitimate teenage pregnancies.2 Furthermore, the state did not
21. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1981) (unlawful for any person to
molest, annoy, or contribute to the delinquency of anyone under 18 years of age); §
288 (all persons are prohibited from committing "any lewd or lascivious act," includ-
ing consensual intercourse with a child under 14); § 286(b)(1) (members of both sexes
may be convicted for engaging in deviant sexual acts with anyone under 18); § 261.5
(females may be charged with aiding and abetting its violation).
22. United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1980); Melloon v. Helgemoe,
564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977).
23. 450 U.S. at 487.
24. d. at 483-87.
25. Id. at 502 n.9.
26. Id. at 492. Justice Blackmun also raised the issue of the privacy rights of
the minor. Id. at 483. The right of minors to have consensual sexual intercourse was
not addressed by the plurality. Justice Blackmun stated that a minor has substantial
privacy rights in intimate affairs, but, in this case the legislative purpose of the stat-
ute overrides the minor's privacy rights. Id. See Comment, The California Statutory
Rape Law: A Violation of the Minor's Right to Privacy?, 12 U.C.D. L. Rav. 332
(1979); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
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meet its burden of proof in showing that a gender-neutral law
would be less effective in deterring sexual activity leading to
teenage pregnancies." In addition, the dissent attacked the
state's argument that a gender-neutral law would be incapable
of enforcement, noting that at least thirty-seven states have
such laws and that the state of California had failed to bring
any evidence showing that these states have experienced en-
forcement problems.2"
The dissent's arguments are more persuasive than those
of the plurality, but the plurality's weak analysis prevailed.
The Court employed the rational relationship test in Michael
M. rather than the intermediate standard of review. 29 The
plurality discussed the right of the state to regulate the sexual
activity of minors in the interest of preventing illegitimate
pregnancies. It, however, did not discuss the statute's "sub-
stantial relationship" to the state's objective, nor did it dis-
cuss whether the "natural sanctions" on the minor females
would have been more of a deterrent than a gender-neutral
statute. If they had, the statute probably would have been de-
clared unconstitutional because of insufficient supporting
evidence.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, correctly noted that the
state did not meet its burden of proof to justify a law which
discriminates against males.3 0 In fact, the plurality did not
place the burden of proof on the state, but presumed the con-
stitutionality of the statute after finding the state's objective
valid. This type of analysis is more reflective of the rational
relationship test, than the Craig test. It appears that Rehn-
quist's dissent3 in Craig, criticizing the intermediate standard
of scrutiny as difficult to administer, is correct. This is evi-
denced by the Court's reasoning and its inability to develop a
27. 450 U.S. at 492-94.
28. Id. at 492.
29. See supra note 6. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, in fact, cites Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483 (1955), the leading cases dealing with the rational relationship test. 450 U.S. at
481 n.13.
30. 450 U.S. at 489 n.2, 492.
31. 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976). "Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and
elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular
types of legislation, masquerading as judgments whether such legislation is directed
at 'important' objectives or, whether the relationship to those objectives is substantial
enough." Id.
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majority opinion in Michael M.
The implications of this case are questionable. It lacks a
majority opinion and no new standards were developed which
could aid future determinations of the constitutionality of
gender based classifications. The holding itself, however, was
not unpredictable. It was consistent with the majority of the
previous decisions of the lower federal and state courts which
concluded that statutory rape laws were constitutional. 2
Although this decision is consistent with the judicial
trend, it is inconsistent with the legislative trend. At least
thirty-nine states have enacted gender-neutral statutory rape
laws. Significantly, most of them have been enacted recently."
The California Supreme Court observed that in all states
which have adopted a neutral law, the change was effected by
legislative action. Not a single state adopted such a rule by
judicial decree. The plurality pointed out that subsequent to
the decision of the California Supreme Court, the California
legislature rejected rendering its statutory rape law gender-
neutral, thereby ratifying the court's judgment.3 8 The legisla-
ture's approval of a statute, in and of itself, does not make it
constitutional and should not influence the Court's decision;
but, the Court seemed intent on supporting the legislative
judgment. Considering that the Court applied the rational re-
lationship test,s and that the judicial trend of the lower
courts is to show deference to the legislature's enactment of
discriminatory statutory rape laws, such laws will now con-
tinue undeterred, regardless of their constitutionality, due to
the decision in Michael M.
Srinoi G. Rousseau
32. See, e.g., Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1979); Hall v. McKenzie,
537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976); Hall v. State, 365 So. 2d 1249 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978),
cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 1253 (1979); State v. Gray, 122 Ariz. 445, 595 P.2d 990,
(1979); People v. Mackey, 46 Cal. App. 3d 755, 120 Cal. Rptr. 157, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 951 (1975); People v. Salinas, 191 Colo. 171, 551 P.2d 703 (1976).
33. Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Law, 27 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 757, 765 (1980).
34. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 3d at 623, 601
P.2d at 576, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
35. 450 U.S. at 471 n.6.
36. This test has traditionally upheld statutes under challenge. See Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAav. L. REv. 1065 (1969); Comment, Fun-
damental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. Cm. L.
REv. 807 (1973).
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PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION-A PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION MAY NOT BE IMPLIED UNDER SECTION 10
OF THE RIVERS AND HARBORS APPROPRIATIONS
ACT OF 1899-California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
The State of California is planning to build a forty-two
mile peripheral canal that will divert water from the Sacra-
mento River before it reaches the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta.'The peripheral canal is part of the California Water
Project which is designed primarily to transport water from
the Northern California region to the more arid and populous
Southern California region. This project has created substan-
tial controversy and has polarized the state. Economic, ecolog-
ical and intra-state power politics are some of the issues in-
volved in this controversy.2
In 1979, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and two
private individuals s brought suit against various state and
federal officials4 to enjoin further construction of the canal.6
They alleged that the diversion of water from the Delta vio-
lates section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act
of 1899,6 which prohibits "[t]he creation of any obstruction
not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable ca-
"17pacity of any of the waters of the United States ... .
0 1982 by Kaveh Shahrokhshahi.
1. See SIERRA, Apr. 1978, at 5, 6-7; NATION, Mar. 7, 1981, at 273.
2. See RAMPARTS, May i970, at 36; R. Fellmeth, RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP
REPORT ON LAND USE IN CALIFORNIA, POLITICS OF LAND, 153, 170-74 (1973).
3. The Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth are non-profit California corpora-
tions; William Dixon is a Delta landowner; and Hank Schramm is a commercial
fisherman active in the San Francisco Bay Area. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp.
610, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
4. The federal defendants were the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Engineers of
the United States Army, the Division Engineer of the South Pacific Division of the
United States Army Corps of Engineers, the District Engineer of Sacramento, the
California District of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the District Engi-
neers for San Francisco, and the California District of the United State Army Corps
of Engineers. The state defendants were the Secretary for Resources and Director of
the Department of Water Resources. The Kern County Water Agency was allowed to
intervene.
5. 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
7. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 provides:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Con-
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The District Court of the Northern District of California
concluded that under section 10 the plaintiffs had an implied
right of action,8 and ruled on the merits that the Army Corps
of Engineers' approval was required. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit upheld the private right of action ruling.,
The California state agency defendants petitioned for a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.10
In California v. Sierra Club," the Supreme Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit."2 The Court held that the respon-
gress, to the navigable capacity of the waters of the United States is
prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building
of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or
other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable
river, or other water of the United States, outside established harbor
lines, or where no harbor lines have been established, except on plans
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secre-
tary of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any
manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition or capacity of,
any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge, or in-
closure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any
navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been recom-
mended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of
the Army prior to beginning the same.
33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
8. Implied private right of action has been defined as "the extension of a civil
remedy to one injured by another's breach of a statute or regulation not providing for
such relief." Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
H~Av. L. REv. 285 (1963). Private right of action and private cause of action are sy-
nonymous terms. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Court, in an attempt
to differentiate other similar legal concepts, stated:
Thus it may be said that jurisdiction is a question of whether a federal
court has the power, under the Constitution or laws of the United
States, to hear a case, . . .; standing is a question of whether a plaintiff
is sufficiently adversary to a defendant to create an Art. III case or con-
troversy, or at least to overcome prudential limitations on federal-court
jurisdiction .... ; cause of action is a question of whether a particular
plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of
law, appropriately invoke the power of the court; and relief is a question
of the various remedies a federal court may make available. A plaintiff
may have a cause of action even though he be entitled to no relief at all,
as, for example, when a plaintiff sues for declaratory or injunctive relief
although his case does not fulfill the 'preconditions' for such equitable
remedies. ...
d. at 239, n.18.
9. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1980). The court of appeals,
however, reversed the district court on other grounds.
10. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in California v. Sierra Club, 449 U.S.
818 (1980).
11. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
12. Justice White, author of the majority opinion, was joined by Justices Bran-
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dents were not entitled to a private right of action to enforce
section 10 of the Act because "[t]he language of the statute
and its legislative history [did] not suggest that the Act was
intended to create federal rights for the especial benefit of a
class of persons . . .,"I' and because there was no "evidence
that Congress anticipated that there would be a private
remedy.""
The Supreme Court first recognized a private right of ac-
tion, known as the doctrine of implication, in 1916.15 For six
decades the scope of this doctrine was uncertain due to the
judiciary's failure to formulate a test.1 During this period,
however, several independent rationales were developed and
finally combined in a single test in Cort v. Ash."' A unanimous
Court listed four factors as "relevant" to the determination of
an implication question:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted,' ...... that is, does the
statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Sec-
ond, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
• . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff?. . . And finally, is the cause of action one tradi-
tionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?"
The Cort factors represent a melange of philosophies of judi-
cial activism in the constitutional scheme of federalism and
separation of powers. For example, the first" and fourth0 fac-
nan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Stevens also filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Rehnquist was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Powell in
a concurring opinion. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
13. 451 U.S. at 297.
14. Id. at 298.
15. Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (an injured employee had a
right of action under the Federal Safety Appliance Act, Ch. 196., 27 Stat. 531 (1893),
as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
16. For a historical survey of the doctrine of implication see Note, Implied Pri-
vate Actions Under Federal Statutes-The Emergence of A Conservative Doctrine, 18
WM. & MARY L. REv. 429 (1976).
17. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
18. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
19. The first factor was pronounced in Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
at 39, where the Court stated that "disregard of the command of the statute is a
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tors encompass a liberal view of implicaton.2' The first factor
focuses on the aggrieved party with the assumption that some
remedy exists. The fourth factor concerns the proper forum,
in which the principle of "necessity" may be embedded. 2
Therefore, the analysis of these two factors begins with a pre-
sumption for implication.
In contrast, the second2 s and third2 ' factors reflect a con-
servative approach25 because the focus of inquiry under those
factors is legislation. The plaintiff has the burden of demon-
strating favorable legislative intent and courts are constrained
by rules of strict statutory construction, such as expressio
unius est exclusio alterius2 s An analysis of the second and
third factors shows a presumption against implication, or a
negative disposition2 7 Thus, Cort may be explained as an at-
wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in
default is implied . ." The Court noted that this principle was derived from the
maxim ubi jus ibi remedium. Id. at 39-40.
20. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
21. Courts following these factors have gone as far as adopting Justice Black's
often quoted rule that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so
as to grant the necessary relief." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). See also J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Tunstall v. Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
22. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
398 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir.
1974).
23. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412
(1975); National R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974).
24. 421 U.S. at 423; 414 U.S. at 458.
25. Note, Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes-The Emergence of
a Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429 (1976).
26. This maxim reflects the principle that if the legislation expressly provides a
particular remedy or remedies, courts should not extend the coverage of the statute
so as to subsume the other remedies. National R.R. Passengers Corp., 414 U.S. at 458.
The maxim expressio unius has been used by the courts in different forms, for exam-
ple in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the Court in negatively
answering the second factor pointed out the express right of action provision in the
other parts of the Act by reasoning that "[o]bviously, then, when Congress wished to
provide a damages remedy, it knew how to do so expressly." Id. at 572.
27. See generally Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Na-
tional R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974); United States v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 621 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1980); Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1981);
Keaukaha-Panaewa Comm. Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 588 F.2d 1216 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979).
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tempt to integrate the Court's divergent approaches in resolv-
ing the question of implication so as to enhance uniformity
and predictability.28
Prior to Cort, the United Stat~s Supreme Court decisions
on implication indicated a conservative trend. The post-Cort29
decisions followed this trend, nearly undermining Cort. Such
conservatism stemmed from the Court's tendency to favor a
restricted role for the federal judiciary by showing a marked
concern for the principles of federalism and separation of
powers.3 0
The Court started its assault on Cort after four years of
adherence to its rule. 1 In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,3 2
the Court declared that the Cort factors were not entitled to
equal weight. It further noted that because main inquiry cen-
tered around legislative intent, Cort's second factor was dis-
positive.3 Touche Ross illustrated that the implication cases
involved a narrow issue of statutory construction3 4 and that
any inquiry into the adequacy of the remedy or remedies pro-
vided in the statute extended beyond the proper scope of in-
quiry.3 5 Touche Ross was followed by Transamerica Mortgage
28. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 302 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
29. Note that Cort was primarily concerned with implication of rights of action
from a federal statute and not from the U.S. Constitution. Even though some courts
have been careless in their analyses, it has become clear that different issues are in-
volved. As Justice Brennan, commenting on the appellate court's use of the Cort test
to determine right of action under the fifth amendment, noted: "This was error, for
the question of who may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally different from the
question of who may enforce a right that is protected by the Constitution." Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. at 241.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974), where Chief
Justice Burger remarked:
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue,
no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular
individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument
that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress,
and ultimately to the political process.
See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 253 (Powell, J., dissenting).
31. Between 1975 and 1979 the Court decided only three implication cases and
followed Cort strictly in each case. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37
(1977). See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
32. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
33. Id. at 576.
34. Id. at 568.
35. The Court, in reference to cases that followed a broad "remedial" policy
(see supra note 20) states, "[wle have adhered to a stricter standard ... and we
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Advisors v. Lewis s' which held that once the first two factors
were answered in the negative, the inquiry was complete.
3 7
Since 1975, the Supreme Court has decided twelve casess"
involving implication, granting a private right of action only
in Cannon v. University of Chicago." Cannon, a civil rights
case involving sex discrimination, was a post-Cort decision;
nevertheless, it indicates the Court's extreme willingness to
imply rights of action in civil rights cases. 0 In all other causes
follow that stricter standard today." Id. at 578. Therefore, it concluded that "[tihe
ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks
that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Id.
36. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
37. Id. at 24.
38. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981); Northwest Airlines v.
Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); University Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S.
754 (1981); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm., 445 U.S. 136 (1980); Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560 (1979); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281 (1979); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1
(1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
39. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) and Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), the Court, by way of dicta, indicated
that a right of action may be implied, but it based its decision on other grounds. In
Ernst & Ernst, the Court held that an action for damages under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Commission's Rule lob-5 required an allega-
tion of intent to deceive or defraud. The Court noted, however, that a private right of
action may be implied under these provisions. The dictum in Ernst & Ernst reaf-
firmed an earlier case (pre-Cort) holding that the buyers and sellers of securities had
a right of action under section 10(b). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, the Court indicated that a right of action
was available under section 215 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15
(1978), in a suit by the clients of an investment adviser seeking rescission of the advi-
sory contract and injunctive relief from further performance. The suit, however, was
dismissed because the plaintiffs had also asked for money damages and the Court
held that a right of action could not be implied in a section 215 suit for damages.
This distinction between the kinds of remedies sought, therefore, has a significant
impact on the right of action analysis. See 444 U.S. at 19.
40. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Allen v.
State Bd. of Election, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 329 U.S. 409
(1968). See also Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights: The Case for
a Sympathetic View, 87 YA.L. L. J. 1378 (1978). In its zeal to imply rights of action in
civil rights cases, the Court at times has offered unclear analyses. For example, in
University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), four Justices simply as-
sumed that a right of action existed because it was not raised in the lower courts.
Four other Justices applied the Cort analysis and concluded that there was a right of
action. In particular, it was pointed out that Cort's first factor was satisfied because
of Bakke's status as a potential beneficiary of a federally funded program. Under this
rationale, therefore, factor one can be satisfied by a plaintiff under a status such as
section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as originally introduced. S.
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of action,41 the Court reacted strongly against implication. 2
It was against this background that California v. Sierra
Club was decided. Sierra Club sheds light not only on Cort's
goals, but it also illuminates the problems inherent in the
post-Cort development of the implication doctrine. These
problems stem from the Court's desire to pursue a conserva-
tive path, yet to preserve the civil rights exception. 43 More-
over, Sierra Club exemplifies the Court's overall behavior in
the area of implication, which is marked by inconsistent legal
reasoning and division among the Justices, resulting in non-
conformity and confusion in the lower courts.
The conservative aspect of Sierra Club manifests itself in
the Court's analysis which centers around Cort's first and sec-
ond factors. Holding that the requirements of the first factor
were not met, Justice White proceeded to determine whether
Congress intended to confer federal rights upon the alleged
beneficiaries." Without analysis, the Court rebutted the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that "private parties who suffer
special injuries because of unauthorized activity affecting the
navigable capacity of our Nation's waters may sue to enforce
...section 10.'4 The error in this conclusion, as the Court
found, was that any person "specially harmed" by the viola-
tion of a statute would be an especial beneficiary of that stat-
ute's proscription, thereby rendering the first factor
meaningless.'
1731, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963). In Cannon, however, the Court noted section 601 as
originally introduced as an example of the type of statute under which factor one
would not be satisfied. 441 U.S. at 693, n.14.
41. See Annot., 61 L.Ed.2d 910 (1979) (investor's protection, securities transac-
tions, corporate mergers, failure of brokerage firms and investment advisors). In gen-
eral, these cases involve grant statutes conferring financial benefits, in contrast to
regulatory statutes that protect persons from harm as in the case of civil rights or
securities fraud. See CETA Workers' Org. Comm. v. City of N.Y., 617 F.2d 926, 933
(2nd Cir. 1980).
42. There have been dissenters occasionally, but no clear pattern is apparent
(except in civil rights cases). It is interesting to note that the Court does not favor the
"administrative deference" rule. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41
(1977).
43. It may be argued that the civil rights exception fits into a broader exception
which includes all regulatory statutes that protect persons from harm. However, at
this time, there is insufficient data to support such a generalization. See supra note
40.
44. 451 U.S. at 294.
45. 610 F.2d 581, 592 (9th Cir. 1980).
46. 451 U.S. at 294.
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The appellate court's conclusion, however, was supported
by legitimate reasoning. The appellate opinion reviewed the
pertinent case law and concluded that its holding was based
on an established practice of granting relief under section 10
to especially harmed plaintiffs."7 The appellate court's ration-
ale is referred to as an "historical explanation" which is per-
fectly acceptable in light of Cannon and other Supreme Court
decisions. 8 Therefore, it appears that the Supreme Court
avoided the appellate court's reasoning by reading the appel-
late court's conclusion out of context.
The majority opinion also cited Cannon in support of its
contention that the statute in question must create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiffs. In Cannon, the Court analyzed
the first factor in detail and concluded that the statutory lan-
guage must either expressly identify, or confer a right directly
upon, the class Congress intended to benefit.4 9 This require-
ment of "intent to benefit" is much broader than the Sierra
Club requirement of "intent to confer federal rights," even
though Cort's language indicates otherwise.'0 Separate analy-
ses have been developed by the lower courts based on this dif-
ference, resulting in Sierra Club's strict conservative
standard. 1
After the Supreme Court concluded that neither the lan-
guage, nor the legislative history, of section 10 supported the
47. 610 F.2d 581, 592 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980). The court of appeals demonstrates the
Supreme Court's acquiescence in this practice.
48. In Cannon, the Court pointed out that two of its past decisions may be
justified using the "historical explanation." 441 U.S. at 692. This reasoning was cited
with approval in Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 577.
49. 441 U.S. at 690.
50. See supra Cort's test in text accompanying note 18.
51. Compare Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979) with
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980). In Hart, private right of
action was implied under section 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1976). With regard to the first factor, the Court reasoned that
"there exists no question whatsoever that handicapped persons are the class 'for
whose especial benefit the [statutes were] enacted.'... Extensive congressional hear-
ings prior to the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act disclosed the failure of existing
programs to serve the needs of handicapped persons." 485 F. Supp. at 68. See also
Chaplin v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1165, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
In denying right of action under section 503, the Rogers court called Hart reasoning
"facile" and emphasized that "[w]hat Cart demands is not that we determine
whether Congress intended to aid a particular class of persons, but that we ascertain
whether Congress intended to 'create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff.'" 611
F.2d at 1079. See also Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co. Inc., 629 F.2d 1226, 1239-40
(7th Cir. 1980).
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first factor, it proceeded to the second factor. The second fac-
tor evidenced no legislative intent either to create such a rem-
edy or to deny one-in fact it was silent. The Court concluded
that this silence, plus other enforcement provisions of the Act,
confirmed that Congress was not concerned with private
rights. 2
The respondents argued that at the time of section 10's
enactment, a common law nuisance cause of action existed for
obstruction of navigable streams, and, therefore, Congres-
sional silence should be interpreted as acquiescence in that
accepted view. The Court rejected this argument, indicating
that such a common law cause of action was not federalized.6
By rebutting the respondent's "historical explanation" instead
of rejecting it, the Court not only reaffirmed its acceptance of
the "historical explanation," but also undermined its earlier
criticism of the appellate opinion. Moreover, by interpreting
Congressional silence on the question of remedy as indicating
that such remedy was not intended, the Court, in effect, held
that the aggrieved party must show an intent to create such a
remedy.54
The Court's reasoning ended after it answered the first
factor in the negative and concluded that the second factor
was neutral. Analytically, the case most closely aligned with
Sierra Club is Touche Ross, in which the Court, after reaching
the same point in its analysis, continued to examine the statu-
tory'scheme in detail. In Sierra Club, the Court treated the
second factor briefly, which is surprising because the Court
denoted it as the most important factor. No formula has been
devised, however, for weighing the factors. A review of the
case law indicates that the courts are inclined to deny impli-
cation upon answering one or more factors in the negative,
52. 457 U.S. at 296.
53. Id. at n.7.
54. Such a holding may also be implied from other decisions such as Tran-
samerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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particularly the second factor.15 In order to imply a right of
55. Table 1-Supreme Court Decisions on Implication, 1975-81.
Result* 1 2 3 4
Y Y Y Y
a. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
b. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
c. University Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
d. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
e. Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
f. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
g. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
Table 2-Appellate Decisions, 1975-81.
Result*
ya
yb
yc
Nd
NeN f
Ng
Nh
Ni
NJ
Nk
N1
N"
1 2 3 4
Y Y Y
* The numbers denote the Cort factors. Y
against implication; S - neutral.
- yes, in favor of implication; N - no,
a. See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th
Cir. 1980); NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3rd Cir. 1979); Lloyd v. Re-
gional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
b. See also Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980).
c. See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2nd Cir. 1977).
d. See City of Evansville, Ind. v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th
Cir. 1979).
e. See Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980).
f. See supra note d.
g. See Gutter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194 (6th
Cir. 1981).
h. See United States v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 621 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1980).
i. See Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981).
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action, all four factors must be positive.5 6 Sierra Club reaf-
firms this conclusion.
Even though the Sierra Club decision appears conserva-
tive, it nevertheless may be viewed as an attempt to preserve
the civil rights exception. The most obvious indication is the
Court's refusal to abolish the implication doctrine entirely.
The Court even declined to adopt the less drastic view ex-
pressed in Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon, which proposed
that the a private right of action should not be implied, ab-
sent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact so
intended.5
The language omitted in the majority opinion is also sig-
nificantly revealing. As discussed earlier, the post-Cort deci-
sions have emphasized the second and third factors which fa-
cilitate the denial of implication, especially in civil rights
cases.58 Most civil rights statutes contain an administrative
remedy and, therefore, the maxim expressio unius59 disposes
of these cases easily.60 Thus, the Court referred to implication
questions primarily as "statutory construction" problems"
and as a result stopped listing the Cort factors.6 2 In short, ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Sierra
Club, these decisions were intended to "limit" Cort.e
The Sierra Club majority deviated from this conservative
approach. First, the Court listed the Cort factors and referred
j. See Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227 (3rd Cir. 1980).
k. See Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980).
I. See Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980).
m. See Riegel Textile Corp. v. Celanese Corp., 649 F.2d 894 (2nd Cir. 1981).
56. There are decisions which implied a right of action in light of neutral or
negative factors. Some of these decisions, however, are under review by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir. 1980); Zeffiro v. First
Penn. Banking & Trust, 623 F.2d 290 (3rd Cir. 1980).
57. 441 U.S. 677 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour 421 U.S. 412
(1975); National R. R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R. R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453 (1974).
59. See supra note 27.
60. See, e.g., Guardian Ass'n of N. Y. City v. Civil Serv., 633 F.2d 232 (2nd Cir.
1980).
61. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77
(1981); Touche Ross, 422 U.S. at 560.
62. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, supra, 415 U.S. 77; University Research Ass'n
v. Contu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
63. 451 U.S. at 302.
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to them as the "preferred" approach. 4 Second, the Court did
not make its routine reference to "statutory construction." Fi-
nally, by emphasizing the first and de-emphasizing the second
factor, the Court attempted to equalize the weight accorded
the two factors. This tilting of the scales is important in civil
rights cases because, in light of Cannon, the first factor may
easily be answered favorably, thereby minimizing the detri-
mental effect of a neutral second factor.6 5 The majority might
reactivate the abandoned rationale used in Cort, where the
Court remarked that in situations where the first factor is pos-
itive and the second factor is neutral, "it is not necessary to
show an intention to create a private cause of action, although
an explicit purpose to deny such a cause of action would be
controlling. '66
Justice Steven's concurring opinion provides a strong ap-
peal to Cort's revival. In explaining that Congress intended to
create a private right of action, he abstained from dissenting
because it was "more important to adhere to the analytical
approach" adopted in Cort67 Justice Stevens reasoned that
Cort presented a balance test which is "a part of our law."
The best indication of the Court's conservative approach
is Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion. To express his view
that too much judicial time is wasted on implication ques-
tions,69 he highlighted the majority's conservative language.
He also criticized the majority for placing "somewhat more
emphasis on Cort v. Ash, than is warranted in light of several
recent 'implied right of action' decisions which limit it. 70 He
also stated that Cort failed to promote "predictability," espe-
cially in light of the many "erroneous Court of Appeals
64. Id. at 292.
65. A neutral second factor is especially harmful when the legal legislation con-
tains other types of remedies because the maxim expressio unius may be used. The
Court may have wanted to ease this effect when it stated: "The creation of one ex-
plicit mode of enforcement is not dispositive of congressional intent with respect to
other complimentary remedies." Id. at 295 n.6. This is, however, unclear in light of
the fact that the Court continued to conclude that the absence of the remedy sought
by the respondents and the enforcement mechanism of the Act reinforced the view
that Congress was not concerned with private rights. Id. at 296.
66. 442 U.S. at 82 (footnotes omitted).
67. 451 U.S. at 301 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Id.
69. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm., 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
70. 451 U.S. at 302 (citations omitted).
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decisions. 7 1
Although it seems that the majority of the lower courts
have understood the Supreme Court's conservative direc-
tion, 2 the courts appear bound by" the subject matter of their
cases rather than by any structured analysis or policy. 73 This
division has led to contradiction over the same questions
among different circuits.74
Sierra Club's impact in the area of environmental law is
unclear. At first glance, it appears that there would be little, if
any, adverse effect, because most environmental legislation
provides for a private right of action. 6 Such a provision, how-
ever, usually contains strict language which, if not followed,
nullifies the provision. 6 In such a case, the only recourse
would be to argue that a right of action is implied under the
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., CETA Workers Org. Comm. v. City of N.Y., 617 F.2d 926, 932 n.3
(2nd Cir. 1980), where the court stated that "[w]e suppose the Court is sending to
Congress and the lower courts a message that, in future statutory drafting, more ex-
plicitness will be required than was present in these cases. The Court seems to be
hitting this political ball back into Congress's court."
In Riegel Textile Corp. v. Celanese Corp., 649 F.2d 894, 897 (2nd Cir. 1980), it
was noted that "[r]ecent Supreme Court decisions have stressed that courts should be
reluctant to imply private right of action."
73. The appellate courts have developed two different lines of analyses from
Supreme Court decisions. One line is pro-implication and the other is anti-implica-
tion. In fact, these two rationales are so distinct that the outcome of a case may be
predicted from the opening sentence of the court's analysis. See, e.g., Chumney v.
Nixon, 615 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980) for pro-implication; Simpson v. Reynolds Metals
Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980) and Keaukaha-Panaewa Comm. v. Hawaiian
Homes Comm'n, 588 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979) for
anti-implication.
Some appellate courts have tried unsuccessfully to explain contradictions in the
analyses of the Supreme Court in different decisions. See, e.g., Rivers v. Rosenthal &
Co., 634 F.2d 774, 782, (5th Cir. 1980).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 621 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir.
1980) and McDaniel v. Univ. of Chicago, 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977); Compare City
of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. i979) with Na-
tional Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 616 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1980), rev'd, 453
U.S. 1 (1981).
75. See, e.g., (legislation with right of action provisions): The Clean Air Act, §
304, 42 U.S.C. § 7617(f) (Supp. II 1978); The Quiet Communities Act 1978, § 7002, 42
U.S.C. § 6901 (Supp. II 1978); The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619
(1976); The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended by the Clean Water
Act of 1977, § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. II 1978); The Safe Drinking Water Act §
1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (Supp. II 1978). There are, however, some statutes without
the right of action provisions. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. § 4231 (1970). For NEPA, however, "historical explanation" may be used.
76. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended by Clean Water
Act, supra note 75, § 505(b) (notice required).
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statute's other provisions."' The possibility of encountering
the same problem in other statutes adds to the significance of
the implication doctrine, and, therefore, environmentalists
and other groups should lobby for broad right of action
provisions.78
Sierra Club demonstrates the Supreme Court's inability
to formulate a clear policy on implication. The Court oscil-
lates between two points. On the one hand, Cort offers a bal-
anced four-part test which can be successful only if the four
factors of the test are given equal consideration. On the other
hand, the Court may adopt a conservative approach that
would abolish the doctrine entirely. Abolishment might ap-
pear an easy solution; however, it has grave consequences, as
Justice Douglas noted in one of his eloquent dissents:
The Court is in the mood to close all possible doors to
judicial review so as to let the existing bureaucracies roll
on to their goal of administrative absolutism. When the
victims of administrative venality or administrative ca-
price are not allowed even to be heard, the abuses of the
monsters we have created will become intolerable. The
77. See, e.g., National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 616 F.2d 1222 (3rd
Cir. 1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling,
604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979). The recent Supreme Court decision, Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), denied a right of
action outside of the Clean Water Act of 1979, § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. II 1978)
and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, § 105(g)(5), 33
U.S.C. § 1415(g) (Supp. 11 1978). This decision reaffirms the Court's strict and con-
servative approach in the area of implication.
78. The following decisions are relevant to environmental law: Clark v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 570 F.2d 1138 (3rd Cir.1977) (held no right of action under the Natural Gas
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976) in suit by injured employees for damages); City of
Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979) (held no right
of action under the Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. II 1978)). In
this case the plaintiffs had failed to comply with section 505.
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
101 S.Ct. 2615 (1981), held no right of action under the Clean Water Act independent
of § 505-citizen's suit provision, and no right of action under the Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 independent of § 105(g)-citizen's suit provi-
sion. District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980), held no right of
action under the Clean Water Act, supra, on behalf of plaintiff challenging state's
issuance of permit for advanced water waste treatment plant.
Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981), held no right of action
under section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, supra.
Riegel Textile Corp. v. Celanese Corp., 649 F.2d 894 (2nd Cir. 1981) held no right
of action under §§ 1263 or 1274 of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1261, § 1274 (1976).
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separation of powers was designed to provide not for judi-
cial supremacy, but for checks and balances.7"
Kaveh Shahrokhshahi
79. National R. R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R. R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 471 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ZONING AND PLANNING-CANCELLATION OF WIL-
LIAMSON ACT CONTRACTS IS LIMITED TO EX-
TRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWN IN EX-
PRESS FINDINGS BY THE LOCAL AGENCY-Sierra
Club v. City of Hayward, 28 Cal. 3d 840, 623 P.2d 180, 171
Cal. Rptr. 619 (1981).
California's Land Conservation Act,' known as the Wil-
liamson Act, is an effort to preserve farm land by offering
preferential tax assessments to landowners who enter ten
year, automatically renewable contracts to keep their land for
agricultural purposes. Recently, in Sierra Club v. City of Hay-
ward,' the California Supreme Court for the first time con-
strued the sections of the Williamson Act which provide for
cancellation of such contracts.3 The court's decision made
cancellation under the old section much more difficult. This
result was of such importance to landowners, developers, and
local governments that it inspired legislative amendment of
the Act to limit the impact of the decision.4
The Williamson Act addresses the problem of agricultural
land near urban areas. This land, when assessed for property
taxes at fair market value for its highest and best use becomes
too costly for the owner to keep for agricultural use.5 Under
the Act, land in a locally designated agricultural preserve,
subject to an agricultural use contract between the landowner
and the local government, is assessed only at its value for agri-
cultural use.' The contract has a ten year term and annually
c 1982 by Jonnie Herring
1. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51200-51295 (West 1966, Supp. 1982).
2. 28 Cal. 3d 840, 623 P.2d 180, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1981).
3. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51280-51286 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981) (amended by
A.B. 2074, 1981 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1095 (West)) (current version at CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 51280-51286 (West 1966, Supp. 1982)).
4. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51280, 51282, 51282.1, 51282.2, 51283.4, 51286. See infra
notes 43, 45, 46 & 48.
5. 28 Cal. 3d at 850, 623 P.2d at 184, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 623-24. See also Note,
The California Land Conservation Act of 1965 and the Fight to Save California's
Prime Agricultural Lands, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1859 (1979); Alden & Shockro, Preferen-
tial Assessment of Agricultural Lands: Preservation or Discrimination? 42 S. CAL. L.
Rzv. 59 (1969).
6. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51242 (West Supp. 1982); CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 423
(West Supp. 1982).
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adds one year to the end of the term unless a party elects
nonrenewal. Once nonrenewal occurs, the remaining nine
year term must run while the assessment gradually returns to
fair market value.8 The Act, however, provided for immediate
cancellation by the landowner when the local government ap-
proved and the landowner paid a penalty."
The dispute in Sierra Club involved a petition to the city
by Hayward ranch owners to cancel a land preservation con-
tract 0 for a small portion of their ranch. 1 The parcel was to
be developed for upper-middle income residential use. Pursu-
ant to statutory mandate, Hayward's city council held public
hearings, made findings of fact, and approved the cancella-
tion.12 Environmentalist groups" opposed cancellation during
7. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51244, 51245 (West Supp. 1982).
8. Id. §§ 51245, 51246. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 426 (West Supp. 1982) pro-
vides a formula which returns the assessment to full cash value without restrictions
over the course of the term.
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51282 (West Supp. 1981) (amended by A.B. no. 2074; 1981
Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1095 (West); current version at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51282 (West
Supp. 1982)); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51283, 51283.1 (WEST SUPP. 1982).
10. The landowners involved had put their land under a Williamson Act "agree-
ment" when the statutes made a distinction between "contract" for prime land and
"agreement" for any land in a designated area. The land in question was under an
"agreement" since, apparently, it did not qualify as prime land. However, the distinc-
tion between "agreement" and "contract" disappeared in 1969 when the Act was
amended. Now the statute calls for contracts which cover land, in an agricultural
preserve, being used for agricultural purposes. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51242 (West Supp.
1982). The court, in footnote four, specified that its construction of the cancellation
provisions applied equally to an agreement or a contract. 28 Cal. 3d at 852-53, 623
P.2d at 185, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
11. Ninety-eight of 600 acres under contract were to be released. The whole
ranch totaled 2,300 acres. 28 Cal. 3d at 847, 623 P.2d at 182, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
The landowners involved have extensive holdings in addition. Telephone interview
with Paula Carrell, Conservation Representative, Sierra Club. (Aug. 1981).
12. The city council gave three reasons for finding the cancellation to be consis-
tent with the Act's intent and in the public interest: (1) Continued grazing use of the
rest of the preserve would not be harmed; (2) the development would put needed
housing in an area contiguous to existing housing; and (3) thirty of the ninety-three
acres were to be dedicated to the city as open space. 28 Cal. 3d at 848, 623 P.2d at
183, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
13. The area chapter of the Sierra Club and two local groups initiated the ac-
tion. When the case reached the supreme court, an amicus curiae brief was submitted
jointly by four organizations including the League of Women Voters and the Audu-
bon Society. A second amicus curiae brief was filed by three state agencies (the Re-
source Agency, the Department of Conservation, and the Office of Planning and Re-
search). The agencies' brief was prepared by outside counsel after the Attorney
General's office concluded that it could not file a brief since it represented Mr. Soda,
the landowner, in three other suits. Briefs for the opposition were filed by the City
Attorney of Hayward and the developer, Ponderosa Homes. Briefs and related mater-
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public hearings and instituted administrative mandamus pro-
ceedings1 ' in superior court to set aside the city council's reso-
lution. Judgment was entered for the city and the landowners.
The decision was affirmed by the court of appeals. 5 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in a four-
to-two decision. The case was remanded to the superior court
with directions to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the city
to vacate its cancellation.
The statutory language at issue appeared in former Cali-
fornia Government Code section 51282. The statute specified
necessary findings and circumscribed consideration of either
the existence of another use for the land under contract or the
uneconomic character of the current agricultural use.'0 The
ials were made available by Jeffrey P. Widman, Sims and Widman, San Jose.
14. A threshold procedural issue concerning mandamus was first addressed by
the Court. The city asserted that the cancellation decision was a legislative one and
therefore reviewable in an ordinary mandamus action. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1085
(West 1980). Thus, the decision could not be reversed unless found to be arbitrary,
capricious, or completely lacking in evidentiary support. The court held that the can-
cellation was adjudicatory and therefore reviewable in administrative mandamus pro-
ceedings. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980). Thus, the action would not be
reversed unless found to be lacking substantial support in the evidence. 28 Cal. 3d at
849, 623 P.2d at 183-84, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 622-23.
"The term 'administrative mandamus' has recently come into use by lawyers and
courts to refer to the writ of mandamus employed to review the quasi-judicial deter-
minations of administrative agencies." 5 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORMA PROCEDURE, Ex-
traordinary Writs § 23 at 3798 (2d ed. 1971). Witkin describes quasi-legislative acts,
which are excluded from administrative mandamus, as the "establishment of regula-
tions to carry out a statutory policy or direction .... The distinction between quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative acts turns on the function performed." Id. § 215 at 3971.
The code section establishing administrative mandamus specifies that the writ is used
when the order or decision in question was "made as the result of a proceeding in
which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and
discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation,
board or officer . . . ." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(a) (West 1980).
The dissenting opinion in Sierra Club accepted without comment the use of ad-
ministrative mandamus. This judicial pronouncement is now incorporated in CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 51280 (West Supp. 1982).
15. Sierra Club v. City of Hayward, 107 Cal. App. 3d 127, 165 Cal. Rptr. 581
(1980), vacated, 28 Cal. 3d 840, 623 P.2d 180, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1981).
16. The pertinent statutory language in force at the time of the decision is as
follows:
The landowner may petition the board or council for cancellation of
any contract as to all or any part of the subject land. The board or coun-
cil may approve the cancellation of a contract only if they find:
(a) That the cancellation is not inconsistent with the purposes of
this chapter; and
(b) That cancellation is in the public interest.
The existence of an opportunity for another use of the land in-
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Hayward city council found that the cancellation in question
satisfied the requirements in subdivisions (a) and (b) of the
statute. However, the city council did not address the two
paragraphs in the statute following the subdivisions. The
court found the city council incorrectly interpreted the cancel-
lation provisions of the Williamson Act. The council's findings
were improper and incomplete. The court's holding was based
on four conclusions:
1) A cancellation is consistent with the Act's purposes
where the proposed new use was not predictable and could
not presently be accomplished through nonrenewal.
2) A cancellation cannot be held to be in the public in-
terest unless it is expressly shown that some new public inter-
est substantially outweighs the public interest in protecting
agricultural land.
3) The cancellation statute mandates the city council to
expressly find that there is no "proximate," noncontract land
available for the proposed "use." Here, "proximate" means
"close enough . . . to serve as a practical alternative" and
"use" means "substantially similar use."
4) There must also be a finding that no alternative agri-
cultural use for the land exists. In addition, the landowner
must show the changed circumstances, other than a develop-
ment opportunity, which make the existing agricultural use
uneconomic.
The court began with an overview of the Williamson Act
and reviewed the problems of loss of farm land and disorderly
urban growth which faced the legislature. The court perceived
the Williamson Act to be an attempt by the legislature to
ameliorate these problems by easing the tax burden on agri-
volved shall not be sufficient reason for the cancellation of a contract. A
potential alternative use of the land may be considered only if there is
no proximate, noncontracted land suitable for the use to which it is pro-
posed the contracted land be put.
The uneconomic character of an existing agricultural use shall like-
wise not be sufficient reason for cancellation of the contract. The uneco-
nomic character of the existing use may be considered only if there is no
other reasonable or comparable agricultural use to which the land may
be put.
Former CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51282. (West Supp. 1981) (current version at CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 51282 (West Supp. 1982)). 28 Cal. 3d at 855, 623 P.2d at 187-88, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 627. Id. at 858, 623 P.2d at 189, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 628. Id. at 862, 623 P.2d at
192, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 631. Id. at 863, 623 P.2d at 192-93, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
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cultural property. 7 The court also noted the California consti-
tutional amendment which permits the Act's preferential tax
assessment system, and stressed the constitutional require-
ment that land favorably assessed be "enforceably
restricted."18
The court stated that an easily obtainable cancellation
was inconsistent with the Act, for it allowed speculators to
hold agricultural land at favorable tax rates until a develop-
ment opportunity matured. The court drew on statutory lan-
guage,19 legislative history,20 and Attorney General opinionsai
to support its conclusion that the cancellation provision was
17. 28 Cal. 3d at 850, 623 P.2d at 184, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
18. CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 8 (West Supp. 1982). The constitutional section was
enacted in the general election of 1966. It contains the following pertinent language:
To promote the conservation, preservation and continued existence of
open space lands, the Legislature may define open space land and shall
provide that when this land is enforceably restricted, in a manner speci-
fied by the Legislature, to recreation, enjoyment of scenic beauty, use or
conservation of natural resources, or production of food or fiber, it shall
be valued for property tax purposes only on a basis that is consistent
with its restrictions and uses.
Prior to the addition of that section, preferential assessment had been inconsistent
with the constitution's requirement that property be taxed at fair market value. CAL.
CONST. art. 13, § 1 (West 1954).
19. The court quoted from CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51280 (West 1974) (current ver-
sion at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51280 (West Supp. 1982)), which reads:
It is hereby declared that the purpose of this article [on cancellation] is
to provide relief from the provisions of contracts entered into pursuant
to this chapter only when the continued dedication of land under such
contracts to agricultural use is neither necessary nor desirable for the
purposes of this chapter. 28 Cal. 3d at 853, 623 P.2d 186, 171 Cal. Rptr.
at 625.
The court stressed the words "nor desirable" and inferred that only an extraordinary
situation would meet the test. Id.
20. One legislative report referred to cancellation as intended for "strictly emer-
gency situation." 28 Cal. 3d at 852, 623 P.2d at 186, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 625, quoting
PRELIMINARY REP. OF JOINT COMM. ON OPEN SPACE, APPEN TO CAL. SENATE J. (1969
REG. SESS.) 10. A second report described nonrenewal as the usual method and can-
cellation as the exceptional method. 28 Cal. 3d at 853, 623 P.3d at 186, 171 Cal. Rptr.
at 625, quoting LAND USE RESEARCH GROUP (U.C. DAVIS), MEASURES FOR STRENGTH-
ENING THE CALIFORNIA LAND CONSERVATION ACT: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS,
REP. TO THE ASSEM. SELECT COMM. ON OPEN SPACE LANDS (1974).
21. In 1972, the Attorney General said that a landowner whose farm was under
contract could not sell twenty acre parcels even though the land was zoned for twenty
acre lots. 54 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 90. In language quoted by the court, the Attorney
General identified nonrenewal as the proper procedure. Id. at 91. In 1979, the Attor-
ney General said that a local government could not approve a tentative subdivision
map proposing to subdivide contract land unless the housing was incidental to the
agricultural use. 62 Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 233. The Attorney General pointed out that
cancellation is prohibited except under stringent conditions. Id. at 240 n.6.
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intended only for extraordinary circumstances. The court
found additional evidence of legislative intent in the cancella-
tion fee 2 and the more recently enacted recapture provi-
sions." The majority of the court saw in those sections legisla-
tive hostility to cancellation. 2' The most significant conclusion
by the court was that cancellation was intended only for ex-
traordinary circumstances. The ancillary rulings clarify those
circumstances which will qualify as extraordinary.
The court began by stating that the statute required a
finding that cancellation be consistent with the purposes of
the Act. The court ruled that because extraordinary circum-
22. Under CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51283 (West Supp. 1982), the land owner must
pay 12.5% of the cancellation valuation of the land to the county treasurer. The valu-
ation is the full cash value of the land when free from restrictions. The fee can be
waived by the local government only if three conditions are met: (1) The cancellation
results from an involuntary change in the current use and the land will not be used
immediately for any more profitable use (In the instant case, the landowner with land
ready for development would not escape the fee.); (2) The council finds that defer-
ment or waiver of the fee is in the best interests of the land preservation program; (3)
The Secretary of the Resources Agency approves the waiver. Id.
23. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51283.1 (West Supp. 1981), added in 1978, recaptures
some of the deferred taxes by requiring the landowner to pay an amount in addition
to the fee for cancellation. The section uses an involved formula which requires find-
ing the difference in the land's value for restricted and nonrestricted use in both a
base year and the current year. The two differences are averaged and that average is
multiplied by a factor related to and slightly greater than the number of years (up to
ten) for which the land has been under contract. Finally, the amount of cancellation
fee under CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51283 (West Supp. 1981) is subtracted, and the remain-
der is the amount of deferred taxes to be repaid. Waiver of this section is much sim-
pler than waiver of the fee. The council need only find that waiver is in the public
interest.
24. 28 Cal. 3d at 853, 623 P.2d at 186, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 625. The dissenting
opinion in Sierra Club said that those provisions were intended to equalize cancella-
tion with nonrenewal where taxes gradually rise as the term expires. 28 Cal. 3d at 869,
623 P.2d at 196, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 635. Commentators have described the fee as in-
tended to inhibit cancellation. See, e.g., Snyder, Toward Land Use Stability Through
Contracts, 6 NAT'L RESOURCE J. 406, 412 (1966); Alden & Shockro, supra note 5, at
64. However, one study found that in some cases the fee could cease to be a restraint
on cancellation. Mix, Restricted Use Assessment in California: Can It Fulfill Its
Objectives? 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 259 (1971). Using a hypothetical situation, that
study found that over several years the cumulative tax savings might surpass the
cancellation fee, leaving the landowner with a net gain if the contract were cancelled
after that point. The new recapture provision would alter the numbers and make the
time period longer, but the possibility of net gain due to tax savings remains. The net
gain, of course, is apart from profit from a sale of the land after cancellation. It is
noteworthy that the landowners in the instant case were prepared to pay $148,175.
165 Cal. Rptr. at 583 vacated, 28 Cal. 3d 840, 623 P.2d 180, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1981).
It appears that if the Legislature intended the fee and recapture to prevent cancella-
tion, the provisions have not been effective when land is ripe for development.
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stances were not shown the city council did not possess suffi-
cient evidence to justify cancellation as opposed to nonre-
newal. Moreover, there was evidence that the proposed
development was long anticipated. The court held that where
the proposed use was predictable, and earlier nonrenewal was
available, cancellation is inconsistent with the purposes of the
Act.2 5. Further, the court asserted that cancellation obtainable
at the mere showing of a more valuable use might violate the
constitutional requirement of enforceable restriction.
The court next addressed the requirement that cancella-
tion be in the public interest. The court reasoned that the ref-
erence to the public interest must be given broad construction
in light of the Act's opening statement concerning the inter-
ests of state and nation.2 Thus, local interests alone are not
sufficient in determining the public interest. The court as-
serted that since the purpose of the Act was to preserve agri-
cultural land and the Act allows cancellation, it is manifest
that the legislature envisioned instances in which some other
public interest would outweigh the public interest in agricul-
tural land. Therefore, the court held that an express finding
that cancellation is in the public interest must include a show-
ing that the public interest in agricultural land is substan-
tially outweighed by some competing public interest.2 7
The third requirement involved the city council's duty to
ascertain the availability of proximate, noncontract land suit-
able for the proposed new purpose. Here, the court addressed
two problems: 1) Does the statute mean that a finding must
be made? and 2) If findings are required must they be ex-
press? In answering the first question affirmatively, the major-
ity of the court implicitly rejected the construction presented
by the dissent. The dissent asserted that no finding was neces-
sary since the two paragraphs concerning proximate, noncon-
tract land and uneconomic argicultural uses were included in
the statute as "illustrative examples"2 8 of factors which a local
25. 28 Cal. 3d at 855, 623 P.2d at 187, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
26. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51220(a) (West Supp. 1982).
27. The court acknowledged a competing public interest in the need for the
proposed type of housing. However, absent the sort of weighing of interests required
for an express finding that one interest substantially outweighed the other, the court
could not tell whether the council adequately gauged the competing public interests.
Since the case was disposed of on other grounds, the court did not go further. 28 Cal.
3d at 857-58, 623 P.2d at 189, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
28. 28 Cal. 3d at 865, 623 P.2d at 194, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
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government might consider in reaching the two findings ex-
plicitly required in subdivisions (a) and (b) of former section
51828. Without commenting on that interpretation, the major-
ity decided that findings related to each of the two paragraphs
are necessary "to insure that the broader purposes of the sec-
tion are met."29 The majority construed the statute as if it
contained a subdivision (c) dealing with proximate, noncon-
tract land, and a subdivision (d) dealing with uneconomic ag-
ricultural use. To that extent, the dissent was justified in ac-
cusing the majority of reading into the statute language which
was not there. The majority based its ruling on its concern "to
prevent frustration of the land preservation goals of the Wil-
liamson Act."80
Since cancellation is only for extraordinary situations,
cancellation can occur only when some other use for the land
has been proposed. (If the object is simply to end the con-
tract, without a new use in mind, the proper course is nonre-
newal.) The statute stated that the new use cannot be consid-
ered at all until it is shown that there is no proximate,
noncontract land available. The majority concluded, therefore,
that the legislature intended the question of such availability
to be part of every cancellation hearing.
The court also declared that a finding that no proximate,
noncontract land is available must be express. This overruled
the court of appeal's decision. The appellate court, accepting
arguendo the need for such a finding,' extracted the neces-
sary finding from several city council resolutions which, taken
together, sufficed.2 The supreme court applied the Topanga
Assocation for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles
29. 28 Cal. 3d at 860, 623 P.2d at 190, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
30. 28 Cal. 3d at 860, 623 P.2d at 191, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 630. In two footnotes
the court recognized a trend toward more cancellations (28 Cal. 3d at 856 n.8, 623
P.2d at 188, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 627, citing figures from State Bd. of Equalization, As-
sessment Practices Survey (1980)) and a number of incentives for local governments
to improperly cancel contracts (28 Cal. 3d at 861 n.11, 263 P.2d at 191, 171 Cal. Rptr.
at 630, referring to REP. TO THE ASSEM. SELECT COMM. ON OPEN SPACE LANDS, supra
note 20). Those notes by the court reflect its judgment of the manner in which local
governments administer land preservation efforts. The court's judgment is reflected
in its determination to protect the Williamson Act by making cancellation difficult.
28 Cal. 3d at 862, 23 P.2d at 192, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
31. The appellate court was uncertain as to the correct procedure. The court
found the statutory language "ambiguous and obscure." 165 Cal. Rptr. at 584, va-
cated, 28 Cal. 3d 840, 623 P.2d 180, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1981).
32. Id., at 585, vacated, 28 Cal. 3d 840, 623 P.2d 180, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1981).
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rule which states: "[T]he agency which renders the challenged
decision must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap be-
tween the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order
. . "8 This rule mandates that an agency must set forth the
express findings which lead a decision. This enables a review-
ing court to follow the agency's reasoning and ascertain
whether the decision was made on a permissible basis. The
court followed the rule in the instant case and commanded
that an express finding as to proximate noncontract land be
made."'
As part of its discussion of proximate noncontract land,
the court defined "proximate" and "use" for the purposes of
the statute. In doing so, the court again referred to the land
preservation purposes of the Act. The court decided that
those purposes were best served by a flexible definition which
makes finding available noncontract land more likely and,
therefore, cancellation more difficult. Accordingly, the court
defined "proximate" land as land "close enough to the re-
stricted parcel to serve as a practical alternative for the pro-
posed use,"8 5 and "use" as any "substantially similar use." s6
The fourth section of the cancellation provision required
that no other reasonable agricultural use for the land be found
to exist before considering the uneconomic nature of the cur-
rent use. The court stated that its discussion of the need for
findings concerning proximate, noncontract land applied.37
33. 11 Cal. 3d 506, 515, 522 P.2d 12, 17, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841.
34. 28 Cal. 3d at 862, 623 P.2d at 192, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 631. Topanga is often
cited with approval. See, e.g., Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d
1134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979) (subdivision approvals are adjudicatory decisions and
require adequate findings by local agency); Bakman v. State Dep't of Trans. 99 Cal.
App. 3d 655, 160 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1979) (decision as to airport extension, like all quasi-
judicial administrative actions, required express findings); Feather River Trailer Sales
v. Sillas 96 Cal. App. 3d 234, 158 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1979) (administrative hearing by
Dept. of Motor Vehicles required express findings). It is noteworthy that the court
implicitly rejected the appellate court approach. The court did not make an express
ruling as to the application of the Topanga rule. However, the court's discussion indi-
cated that where findings are required they must be express. "Indeed, even the exis-
tence of substantial evidence to support a necessary determination would not compel
a conclusion that the determination was in fact made." 28 Cal. 3d at 859, 623 P.2d at
190, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 629. The reviewing court must have express findings-it is not
to create them out of the record.
35. 28 Cal. 3d at 861, 623 P.2d at 192, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 631. Substantially simi-
lar language is contained in CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51282(c) (West Supp. 1982).
36. 28 Cal. 3d at 862, 623 P.2d at 192, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
37. The focus of the case was on the issue of proximate noncontract land avails-
1982] 973
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
Thus, a local government must expressly find that no alterna-
tive agricultural use for the land exists. The court also re-
quired that when the use originally protected by contract was
the same use being rejected as uneconomic during cancellation
hearings, it must be demonstrated in the findings how that
use became uneconomic.38 Without such evidence, the court
concluded that the only change, in the instant case, was that a
more profitable development opportunity had arisen. Cancel-
lation on such a basis was not the legislature's intent. There-
fore, the court ruled that a landowner must show that condi-
tions, other than development possibilities, had changed,
making the current use uneconomic.3 9
The reasoning adopted by the court reflects the court's
position in the ongoing debate over the preservation of open
land. Clearly, the court wanted to strengthen the Williamson
Act's protections for agricultural land. 40 Thus, Sierra Club
ble for the proposed new use. The landowner had not claimed that the use of the land
for grazing was uneconomic; rather, he had urged a new use (housing) for his land.
However, at least once in the series of briefs the Sierra Club addressed the question
of uneconomic agricultural use by asserting that even though the landowner's request
for cancellation was not based on the uneconomic character of the agricultural use,
nonetheless, the city should have established that no reasonable alternative existed.
Opening Brief for Appellant, Sierra Club v. City of Hayward, 28 Cal. 3d 840, 623 P.2d
180, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1981). The supreme court construed all the cancellation pro-
visions rather than deciding narrowly on one aspect. Therefore, the decision included
some discussion of the need for findings as to the uneconomic character of the agri-
cultural use.
38. The land involved was marginal agricultural land suitable for grazing. 165
Cal. Rptr. at 587, vacated, 28 Cal. 3d 840, 623 P.2d 180, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1981).
Though the landowners possibly could have satisfied the court's uneconomic use re-
quirement, they would have failed on predictability of the proposed new use.
39. 28 Cal. 3d at 863, 623 P.2d at 192-93, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32.
40. The court's support of the Act as a land preservation device is exemplified
in the following language:
The act is intended to preserve open space land. But if those with an
eye toward developing such land within a few years are allowed to enroll
in contracts, enjoy the tax benefits during their short holding period,
then cancel and commence construction on a showing that the land is
ripe for needed housing, the act would simply function as a tax shelter
for real estate speculators. The Legislature's findings clearly spell out its
intent, and nowhere among them appears a motivation to subsidize
those who would subdivide. On the contrary, the overwhelming theme of
the legislation is the need to preserve undeveloped lands in the face of
development pressures.
28 Cal. 3d at 853, 623 P.2d at 186, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 625. In addition the final section
of the decision begins with a vigorous endorsement of protection of agricultural land:
In adopting the Williamson Act, the Legislature attempted to safeguard
for the citizens of our state a legacy of rich and scenic land. California's
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was an attempt by the court to ensure the Act's position as an
integral part of California's land preservation efforts. The
Williamson Act has gone through several phases"' generally
aimed at finding an effective way to encourage preservation of
agricultural land without mandating it. Case law has played a
limited role thus far since activity has centered around statu-
tory changes.4 2 The issue of cancellation of the Act's contracts
was a question of first impression for the court. Through its
opinion, the court approved the Act's efforts to restrict devel-
opment of agricultural land. However, the full effect of the
rulings in Sierra Club was short-lived. The rulings were
merged into statutory law in modified form. The statutory
changes eviscerated the court's attempted fortification of the
inviolability of the Williamson Act's cancellation provisions.a
The Legislative Counsel's Digest accompanying the statute
proclaims that the bill "would expand the ability of a local
agency to cancel a Williamson Act contract. '44
The statutes, as amended, allow a board or council to ap-
prove a cancellation by finding either that the cancellation is
agricultural industry is not only a vital part of the state's economy, it is
a crucial source of nourishment for the entire nation . . . . Unspoiled
agricultural lands near cities provide not just food, but also a welcome
scenic respite from the cluttered urban landscape.
28 Cal. 3d at 863, 623 P.2d at 193, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
41. For a concise history of the Act's changes, see Dorcich v. Johnson, 110 Cal.
App. 3d 487, 492-94, 167 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900-01; STANFORD ENVIRONmENTAL LAW SOC-
wry, The Property Tax and Open Space Preservation in California: A Study of the
Williamson Act (1974).
42. For example, former CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 51282 (West 1966) (repealed 1969)
originally provided for cancellation upon approval by the Director of Agriculture after
a recommendation by the State Board of Agriculture. In 1969, the cancellation mech-
anism was shifted to the local agency. The requirements for findings remained un-
changed. The original act made the distinction between "agreements" and "con-
tracts" already noted. See supra note 10. The original act also included a subvention
program CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51260-51263 (West 1966) (repealed 1969), by which the
state paid the local government $1 per acre under contract each year, and the local
government paid the landowner $0.05 per $1 assessed valuation of contract land each
year. That program was repealed in 1969.
43. A.B. 2074 (1981 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1095 (West)), codified at CAL. GOv'T
CODE §§ 51280, 51282, 51282.1, 51282.2, 51283.4 & 51286.6 (West Supp. 1982) is a
compromise between two bills. Senator Boatwright, author of the rival bill, dropped
his bill and was a principal coauthor of the remaining bill, originally introduced by
Assemblyman Robinson. Telephone interviews with Paula Carrell, supra note 11, and
Thomas Willoughby, Chief Consultant, Assembly Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources (Aug. 1981). For a summary of the amendments and additions, see infra
note 45. See also infra note 46.
44. 1981 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4098, ch. 1095 (West).
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consistent with the Act's purposes or that it is in the public
interest. Finding both is no longer required. For either find-
ing, specific initial findings which incorporate some of the
court's rulings are necessary. 45 The limitation on considering
the uneconomic nature of the existing use remains intact, but
without any need to show changed conditions. Also, a one-
time chance for relatively easy cancellation was added.,6 The
new legislation provides that no findings are required other
than those expressly stated, thereby rejecting any attempt by
the court to read in additional requirements.
Reading in additional requirements was one of the points
raised by the dissent in Sierra Club. In addition, the dissent
asserted that the majority misinterpreted the cancellation fee
and recapture provision. However, the dissent's primary disa-
greement was the majority's treatment of the Williamson
Act's purposes. Though the majority recognized the Act's
double purpose of preserving agricultural land and promoting
orderly development, the dissent contended that the majority
focused only on land preservation. The majority's adoption of
45. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51282 (West Supp. 1982). For the cancellation to be con-
sistent with the Act's purposes, five findings must be made:
(1) a notice of nonrenewal has been served,
(2) removal of adjacent lands from agricultural use is not likely,
(3) there is an alternative use which is consistent with the city or county general
plan,
(4) discontiguous patterns of development will not result, and
(5) no proximate, noncontract land suitable for the proposed use is available, or
development of the contracted land will provide more contiguous patterns than de-
velopment of proximate, noncontract land. The definitions of proximate land and use
are consistent with the court's ruling.
For cancellation to be in the public interest, two findings must be made:
(1) other public interests substantially outweigh the objectives of the Act, and
(2) no proximate, noncontract land suitable for the proposed use is available, or
development of the contracted land will provide more contiguous patterns than de-
velopment of proximate, noncontract land. Again, the court's definitions are used.
While the court's rulings remain, they are divided so that it is no longer necessary to
find all that Sierra Club required. While the finding as to proximate, noncontract
land is necessary either way, the mere existence of such land will not automatically
bar cancellation. Id.
46. Cal. Gov't Code § 51282.1 (West Supp. 1982) established a one-time "win-
dow" during which cancellations may be approved upon findings that discontiguous
patterns of development will not result and that the alternative use (which must be
specified) will be consistent with the local government's general plan. Owners of con-
tract land were notified of the opportunity within 60 days of the statute's effective
date and had 150 days within which to file a petition. The Legislature also added §
51282.2 (West Supp. 1982) allowing cities with little land under contract (300 acres
maximum) to cancel contracts without any findings.
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this goal prompted it to interpret legislative intent and statu-
tory language in a manner consistent with stringent require-
ments for release of land. The dissent did not quarrel with the
majority's motive, only with the majority's zeal in construing
the statute.47
The dissent did not elaborate on the need for orderly de-
velopment. However, it is clear that Sierra Club as decided
will impact upon local government development. Since cancel-
lation was limited to the extraordinary, unforeseeable situa-
tion, local governments must be sure a ten year development
plan is in place before entering or renewing a Williamson Act
contract. Presumably, orderly planned growth is a predictable
growth. Therefore, when a local government's general plan
forecasts growth or changing usage in an agricultural area, it
may automatically bar any land in that area under contract
from cancellation by making the change predictable and non-
renewal the only course. The statutory changes do not specifi-
cally alter the court's ruling4 8 on this issue. However, one re-
quirement for finding cancellation to be consistent with the
Act's purposes will be a finding that the new use is consistent
with the local general plan.4' That implies that a new use can
be predictable without forestalling cancellation. A new use
specifically recognized by a local plan-and so consistent with
it-is consistent with the Act, although it is certainly
predictable.
The effect of the decision on landowners was similar to
that on local governments. Under the decision, the landowner
had to forecast the next ten years before entering or renewing
a Williamson Act contract. Given the burden of proof imposed
to establish the circumstances justifying cancellation of a con-
47. "The issue, of course, is not whether the majority has thereby fashioned a
better law. The salient point is that it is no part of our function of appellate review to
legislate at all." 28 Cal. 3d at 869, 623 P.2d at 196, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
48. Section 51280, as amended, removes the language that cancellation is availa-
ble only when the continued restriction is "neither necessary nor desirable." See
supra note 19. The new version simply says, "It is hereby declared that the purpose
of this article is to provide relief from the provisions of contracts entered into pursu-
ant to this chapter under the circumstances and conditions provided herein." CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 51280 (West Supp. 1982). The change removes one of the foundations
for the majority's ruling that cancellation requires extraordinary circumstances. How-
ever, since the court looked to several sources, including the constitution and the
preamble to the Act, it is not clear that the Legislature has stated an intention differ-
ent from the court's ruling or that the ruling will not still stand.
49. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51282(b)(3) (West Supp. 1982).
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tract, no landowner could count on being able to cancel suc-
cessfully. The recent legislation alters the owner's burden of
showing uneconomic agricultural use. Showing changed cir-
cumstances will not be required5" and the language concerning
alternative agricultural uses remains nearly intact.5 1 The cur-
rent statute does not attach that language to either of the re-
quired findings, however, leaving unclear whether a finding is
necessary. In fact, that language is similar to the ambiguous
language which gave rise to the issue in Sierra Club.
The court attempted to aid the preservation of agricul-
tural land by halting any trend toward cancellation. However,
the statute changes this. The availability of a one-time "win-
dow" for cancellation will result in some land going out of
contract at once.52 The long term effect may be a decline in
the amount of land under contract since some owners will be-
gin nonrenewal and others will decide against contracts ini-
tially. Another effect in long term preservation of land, which
the Sierra Club decision will exacerbate, will result from a
particular weakness of the Williamson Act. Contracts now are
available to all agricultural land in preserves on a voluntary
basis. Much of the land under contract is not currently
threatened by development and is not prime land. s In fact, in
Sierra Club's Alameda County setting, the bulk of contract
land is not within three miles of any city and is not prime
agricultural land.' The prime land, in the most desirable lo-
cations, has never been under contract and is being lost to de-
50. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51282 (West Supp. 1982).
51. The new version's change is the addition of the words "by itself" into the
paragraph, "[T]he uneconomic character of an existing agricultural use shall not by
itself be sufficient reason for cancellation .... " CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51282(d) (West
Supp. 1982).
52. See supra note 46. The proposed "window," with its requirements of a spec-
ified use, no discontiguous development, and a one-year term in which the landown-
ers must complete all requirements, will accommodate landowners with contract land
now on the urban fringe and ready to be developed. It is expected that some prime
land will be freed from contract during the "window." Telephone interview with
Paula Carrell, supra note 11.
53. See, e.g., Doran, Proposition 13: A Mandate to Reevaluate the Williamson
Act, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 93, 100 (1980); Kurtz, The Dilemma of Preserving Open
Space Land-How to Make Californians an Offer They Can't Refuse, 13 SANTA
CLAR LAW 284, 291 (1972).
54. In 1978, in Alameda County, 197,010.95 acres were under contract, of which
only 9,400 acres were prime. Note, supra note 5, at 1877. The 1978 County Agricul-
tural Preserve map showed 90% of the contract land to be three or more miles from
any city. Id. at 1880.
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velopment. "[I]n a very real sense, the Williamson Act is sav-
ing the wrong land in Alameda County.""5 Making contracts
less attractive to cities and landowners can be expected to in-
crease the problem. If either the city or the owner foresees
that particular land might be developed within the next dec-
ade, the land will not be put under contract. Alternately, the
changes in the Act, while prompting use of the contracts by
easing restriction on cancellation, fail to respond to the under-
lying problem.
A separate issue which arises now that the cancellation
provisions are significantly weakened is whether the supreme
court will rule contracts under the new provisions to be not
"enforceably restricted" as required by the constitution 5 and
hence in violation of the constituion. In particular, the idea of
a one-time chance for fairly easy cancellation could be incon-
sistent with the constitution. The court discussed briefly the
constitutional restriction but no ruling was involved in the in-
stant case. Any possible challenge remains for the future.
In sum, the Sierra Club decision held that cancellation of
a Williamson Act contract can be approved only in extraordi-
nary circumstances which must be demonstrated through a
series of specific findings which the local government must
make. The effect was to make cancellation much more diffi-
cult and contracts less desirable to local governments and to
landowners. The new legislation undermines the court's at-
tempt to make cancellation of Williamson contracts less prev-
alent. However, the court may yet have the final riposte if it
gets an opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the new
Williamson Act.
Jonnie Herring
55. Id.
56. CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 8 (West Supp. 1982); see supra note 18.
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